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Abstract 
Objective: Until recently few studies have examined the relationship between home foreclosures and 
crime. Foreclosures are one major source of neighborhood instability and can be expected to affect 
crime from several theoretical perspectives. Some recent research has found conflicting results on 
whether foreclosures cause crime.  
Method: This study examines whether foreclosures are a robust predictor of crime and whether the 
effect of foreclosures on crime varies across neighborhood contexts. We estimate fixed effects 
negative binomial models using geocoded Indianapolis foreclosure and crime data for 2003 to 2008 
to predict crime counts in 1,000-feet X 1,000-feet square grid cells.  
Result: Foreclosures exhibit consistent positive effects on indices of overall, property, and violent 
UCR reported offenses in a cell and rape, aggravated assault, and burglary counts. In addition, 
foreclosures had greater effects on reported UCR crimes in stable neighborhoods, especially those 
with more owner-occupied homes.  
Conclusion: Foreclosures were a robust predictor of crime in the current study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The growth in the number of foreclosures that resulted from the recent housing crisis in 
America has brought considerable attention to the detrimental effects of foreclosures on 
neighborhood instability. Criminological research has focused on the role of neighborhood stability 
since at least the days of Shaw and McKay (1972). A large body of housing research suggests that 
foreclosures are detrimental to the stability of neighborhoods1 . Yet, until recently, little research has 
examined the relationship between foreclosures and crime. 
As will be outlined below, there are several theoretical reasons why one might expect 
foreclosures to increase crime. Routine activities, social disorganization, rational choice and even 
general strain theories all predict that foreclosures and crime would be related. From the standpoint 
of routine activities theory, foreclosures might be associated with increased crime due to increased 
prevalence of vacant or abandoned properties, which are less likely to have adequate guardianship 
and present easier targets for crime. Social disorganization theory predicts that foreclosures would 
increase crime by increasing residential mobility, which would likely reduce social cohesion and 
community ties, and reduce informal social control. So there are a variety of reasons to expect 
foreclosures to be associated with higher crime.  
Several recent studies have examined foreclosures and crime (e.g., Bess, 2008; Cui, 2011; 
Goodstein & Lee, 2010; Harris, 2011; Immergluck & Smith, 2006b; Kirk & Hyra, 2011). Some of 
these studies were cross sectional (Acevedo, 2009; Immergluck & Smith, 2006b) limiting the ability 
to discern causation. Others were longitudinal studies but included fairly large units of analysis such 
as counties (Goodstein & Lee, 2010), census tracts (Kirk & Hyra, 2011), or police beats (Harris, 
1 Scholars not only have examined the discount price of foreclosed home sales (Crawford & Rosenblatt, 1995; 
Pennington-Cross, 2006), but also the external costs and societal impacts of concentrated home foreclosures on 
neighborhoods. For instance, foreclosures have been found to have a negative effect on the value of surrounding 
properties (Immergluck & Smith, 2006a; Schuetz, Been, & Ellen, 2008; Harding, Rosenblatt, & Yao 2009; Lin, 
Rosenblatt, & Yao, 2009) and diminish revenues and increase costs for local governments (Moreno, 1995, Apgar & 
Duda, 2005). 
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2011).  We are aware of only two studies (Cui, 2011; Ellen, Lacoe, & Sharygin, 2011) that employ 
units of analysis smaller than a census tract. We argue that small units of analysis are likely critical 
for capturing the impact of foreclosures on crime, which is expected to be limited to a fairly small 
geographic area. 
The current study explores whether there is an independent effect of foreclosures on crime, 
and whether this effect is conditioned by neighborhood characteristics, using panel models and a 
small unit of analysis. Specifically, we estimate fixed effects negative binomial models of 
foreclosures on Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) crime counts in 1,000-feet X 1,000-feet square grid 
cells in Indianapolis, Indiana, from 2003 to 2008.  
FORECLOSURES AND CRIME 
 
Several criminological perspectives have been used to motivate discussions of why one 
would expect foreclosures to be associated with crime. Routine activities theory suggests that crime 
is more likely when crime targets and potential offenders come into contact in the absence of a 
capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Foreclosed homes are less likely to be monitored 
especially when vacant, which presents a greater likelihood that these homes will be perceived as 
suitable targets by would-be offenders (see Ellen et al., 2011).  Research by Spelman (1993) showed 
that abandoned homes were associated with higher crime.  
Others have suggested that social disorganization is a useful framework for thinking about 
how foreclosures might affect crime (e.g., Harris, 2011; Pandit, 2011). Social disorganization theory 
states that community social structural factors such as residential mobility, socioeconomic 
disadvantage, family instability, and ethnic heterogeneity reduce the capacity for neighborhood 
residents to maintain informal social control, leading to higher crime (see Sampson & Groves, 
1989).2 Residential mobility has long been thought to reduce neighborhood social organization. 
2 Recent work in this area refers to the ability or willingness to intervene in neighborhood affairs to maintain social 
control as “collective efficacy” based on Sampson and colleagues’ (1997, 1999, 2004) revamping of the traditional 
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When residents regularly move in and out of a neighborhood, it is harder for people to get to know 
their neighbors and develop and maintain the social ties necessary to create effective informal social 
control. One recent study by Xie and McDowall (2008) found that neighborhood residential turnover 
was associated with increased victimization. Foreclosures are expected to increase residential 
mobility and reduce ties among neighbors (Harris, 2011, p. 24). Other structural elements of social 
disorganization—ethnic/racial heterogeneity and family disruption—have also recently been found to 
be associated with higher foreclosure rates (Li & Morrow-Jones, 2010). Thus, from a social 
disorganization perspective, one would expect foreclosures and crime to be related. 
 Another theory of crime, the so-called “broken windows” theory, focuses on how 
neighborhood physical disorder (e.g., visible litter, broken vehicle or home windows) creates the 
impression that residents don’t care much about their neighborhood and signals to would-be 
criminals that the neighborhood presents a likely target. Over time, signs of physical disorder can 
create a downward spiral for neighborhoods, reduce perceptions of neighborhood safety, and lead to 
higher rates of serious crime (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Pandit (2011) argues that foreclosed homes 
tend to be less well-maintained, especially after vacancy. Such visible evidence of neglect could 
signal to would-be criminals that a neighborhood presents an easier target. Others have argued that 
rational choice (Ellen et al., 2011) or general strain theories (Harris, 2011) would predict foreclosures 
to be associated with increased crime. Thus, it is clear that there are good reasons to expect 
foreclosures and crime to be related from a variety of theoretical perspectives.  
It is also reasonable to consider whether foreclosures would affect crime similarly across all 
neighborhood contexts. For example, Harris (2011, p. 44) argues that disadvantage and population 
density will condition the relationship between foreclosures and crime.  Foreclosures in 
social disorganization framework. Although perhaps a bit of an oversimplification, one might think of collective 
efficacy as the mirror image of social disorganization. For the purposes of this paper, foreclosures would be 
expected to lead to crime through low collective effective efficacy or high social disorganization. For a discussion of 
foreclosures and collective efficacy see Pandit (2011). 
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disadvantaged areas might further weaken fragile informal social networks. Disadvantaged 
neighborhoods may also be likely to have more renters and fewer stable residents. Thus, a 
foreclosure may be especially damaging as it represents the loss of an uncommon asset in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, a stable homeowner. Or, it could be that foreclosures have less of an 
effect on crime in disadvantaged neighborhoods because they already suffer from instability and any 
additional instability caused by foreclosures would not materially alter the neighborhood social fabric 
as much as in more stable, advantaged neighborhoods. Therefore, the current study will examine both 
whether there is an effect of foreclosures on crime and whether this effect is conditioned by other 
neighborhood characteristics such as socioeconomic disadvantage and residential stability. 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
As noted, nearly all studies of foreclosures and crime have been undertaken since 2006. The 
first major study was Immergluck and Smith’s (2006b) cross-sectional study of Chicago census 
tracts. They found that the foreclosure rate affected violent crime but not property crime. Acevedo 
(2009) studied 32 Atlanta census tracts and found that foreclosures were significantly related to 
property crime increases but not violent crime. Teasdale, Clark, and Hinkle (2010) studied 71 Akron 
census tracts in 2003. Using negative binomial models and controlling for prior crime, they found a 
significant effect of foreclosures on counts of larceny, burglary, drugs, and disorderly conduct, 
individually and cumulatively.3 Baumer, Wolff, and Arnio (2011) examined the link between 
foreclosures and crime in 1,507 U.S. counties in 2007 using negative binomial models and 
controlling for spatial autocorrelation. They found significant effects of foreclosure on crime but the 
effects depended on unemployment, levels of new home construction, and resource deprivation. 
3 Bess (2008) examined trends in crime in Charlotte- Mecklenburg from 2003 to 2006. The study found that violent 
crime incidents per 100 households were generally higher in high foreclosure neighborhoods than in low foreclosure 
neighborhoods. This study, however, did not estimate multivariate models or include controls for other 
neighborhood characteristics.  
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Several recent studies of foreclosures and crime have employed panel models. Some used 
large units of analysis such as counties or metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Goodstein and Lee 
(2010) used an instrumental variables approach in their county-level analysis of reported crime from 
2002 to 2007, finding that foreclosures increased total violent and property crimes as well as 
burglary, larceny, and aggravated assault. Foreclosures did not affect rape, robbery, or motor vehicle 
theft as individual outcomes. Similarly, Pandit (2011) estimated changes in crime from 2005 to 2008 
in relation to foreclosures for 225 MSAs with 100,000 or more residents and found that foreclosures 
were not significantly related to change in violent crime but were marginally significantly (p <.10) 
related to changes in property and total crime.4  
 A few panel studies have considered units of analysis smaller than counties or MSAs. Kirk 
and Hyra (2010) studied violent and property crime rate per 1,000 residents in Chicago census tracts 
from 2002 to 2008. Given that current community crime rates are heavily influenced by prior crime 
rates, they employed an Arellano-Bond estimator which allows one to control for lags of the 
dependent variable and eliminate the influence of unobserved time-invariant differences between 
communities. Results showed that the cross-sectional association between foreclosure and both 
property crime and violent crime rates disappeared once one accounted for time-invariant 
confounding influences and simultaneity. Harris (2011) also used Arellano-Bond models to estimate 
dynamic panel models of logged crime rates in 108 Houston police beats from 2005 to 2008. Harris 
(2011) found that foreclosures had positive statistically significant effects on total crime and 
aggravated assaults in the dynamic panel models. There was no effect of foreclosures on theft, or 
burglary and a statistically significant negative effect of foreclosures on homicide and auto theft. 
4 In a somewhat different kind of analysis, Jones and Pridemore (2011) examined whether the housing crisis affected 
crime rates in a weighted least squares analysis of 142 MSAs using the housing mortgage stress index (HMSI). The 
authors found no effect of the HMSI on any of the crimes they tested. This study, however, is not a direct test of the 
effect of individual foreclosures on crime but an examination of whether the large amounts of stress in the housing 
market created when the housing bubble burst affected crime. 
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Harris also found that there was a statistically significant interaction between socioeconomic 
disadvantage and foreclosures and total crime counts but no other interactions were significant.  
We are only aware of two panel studies that use units of analysis smaller than census tracts or 
police beats. Cui (2011) used a difference in difference approach to examine crime in the areas 
immediately surrounding foreclosed homes in Pittsburgh from 2005 to 2009. Cui (2011) compared 
the 250 feet radius circle immediately surrounding a foreclosed home (N=3,282) with a ring of equal 
geographic area immediately surrounding the inner ring (N=3,282), which is intended to serve as a 
control because it has extremely similar characteristics to the treatment area. Cui (2011) found that 
foreclosure did not exert a significant effect on crime in the treatment area until the foreclosed home 
became vacant and found that the effect of vacant foreclosed homes was stronger for violent than 
property crime. Although this study design is unique, it is possible that the effect of foreclosures 
extends beyond the 250 feet radius used in the study. If so, the effect of foreclosures on crime could 
be attenuated because some of the “treatment” effect would be attributed to the comparison area. In 
addition, if there are several foreclosures in close proximity—a high probability in some 
neighborhoods—it would seem necessary to exclude those cases and the effects of multiple, clustered 
foreclosures on crime may be the most significant to consider. 
Finally, Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin (2011) studied the effects of foreclosures on crime in 
New York City face blocks from 2004 to 2008. Using a modification of a fixed effect negative 
binomial model discussed below, the authors found that foreclosures were associated with higher 
crime rates. Ellen et al. (2011) found that the effects of foreclosures on violent and public order 
offenses were stronger than the effect on property offenses. They also found evidence that 
foreclosures caused crime rather than the reverse. This study, however, focuses on New York City 
which has a very large number of multi-unit properties in the areas where the foreclosures are located 
(see Ellen et al., 2011, table 2) and so may not be typical of other cities where relatively more 
foreclosures are in areas with higher proportions of single-family dwellings.  
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In sum, only recently have studies empirically examined whether there is a connection 
between foreclosure and crime, with mixed results. Of the several studies within the last five years, 
only four are longitudinal and include units of analysis smaller than a county or MSA. Of these 
studies, two (Harris, 2011; Kirk & Hyra, 2011) employ fairly large units of analysis such as census 
tracts or police beats. Unfortunately, census tracts tend to be fairly large and can vary tremendously 
in size.5 Because few panel studies of foreclosures and crime have employed small units of analysis 
and studies have shown conflicting results, we argue additional research is needed. In the next 
section, we discuss the data and methods used in the current study. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The primary data for this study include number of crimes reported by the Indianapolis Police 
Department (IPD) and foreclosures listings from the Marion County Indianapolis Board of Realtors 
(MIBOR) from 2003 to 2008. The counts for number of crimes and foreclosures were calculated for 
2,414 1,000-feet X 1,000-feet grid cells within the former Indianapolis Police Department service 
area.6 Socioeconomic variables were collected from the 2000 census at the block and block group 
level and were estimated for each grid cell.  
Unit of Analysis 
The units of analysis for this study are 1,000-feet X 1,000-feet square grid cells overlaid on 
the IPD service area. Grid cells were chosen as the units of analysis as opposed to other possible 
units for the following reasons. Census tracts and block groups, frequently used for these types of 
analysis, vary greatly in size. This is known as the modifiable areal unit problem. To the extent that 
5 For example, in Indianapolis, census tracts range from 127 acres to 2,440 acres (mean = 536 acres). The relatively 
small number of police beats (N=108) in Harris’s (2011) study of Houston suggests that this is also a fairly large 
unit of analysis.   
6 In 1970, the Indianapolis city government consolidated with Marion County government. Police districts, fire 
districts, and school districts were not among the local service districts that were included in the 1970 consolidation. 
The former city of Indianapolis boundaries essentially comprised  the Indianapolis Police District until 2008 when 
IPD consolidated with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. 
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the effect of foreclosures on crime depends upon distance, use of tracts or block groups introduces 
bias into the analysis.7 The problem is further exacerbated as population characteristics are related to 
population densities and hence the sizes of these units. Blocks also pose a problem given that 
reported crimes are often geocoded to street centerlines or intersections and are not uniquely 
associated with individual blocks, making it difficult to identify the number of crimes associated with 
each block. Block faces reduce but do not eliminate the problem of associating crimes with the units 
of analysis. Crimes within a block face are associated with that block face. But significant numbers 
of crimes are geocoded to intersections, which could be allocated to more than one intersecting block 
face (as Ellen et al., 2011 did). In addition, it does not seem reasonable that a foreclosure that may 
have occurred across the street from a property would have a greater effect on crime at that property 
than a foreclosure to a property immediately adjacent to the back of that property. For these reasons, 
uniform grid cells are used as the units of analysis (see also Authors 2009). These units also possess 
the advantage that they provide a natural basis for considering the effects of foreclosures in nearby 
grid cells. Map 1 illustrates the city of Indianapolis, the IPD service area, and the 1,000-feet X 1,000-
feet grid cells used in the current analyses.  
Map 1 about here 
 
The initial dataset consisted of observations for each year from 2003 through 2008 for 2,225 
grid cells that were completely contained within the IPD service area, for a total of 13,350 
observations. Grid cells with some portion of their area outside the IPD service area were excluded 
because some crimes would not have been reported to IPD. We limited the analysis to cells with a 
population count greater than zero; demographic data discussed below could not be calculated for 
some cells. Excluding these cells reduced the sample size by 12.3 percent from 13,350 to 11,712 
(1,952 *6).  
7 The modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) occurs when point level data are aggregated to arbitrarily, 
geographically zonal, modifiable boundaries. The bias may occur as non-uniform boundaries are modified. For this 
reason, this study employs uniform grid boundaries over the study area. 
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Dependent Variables 
The crime data are geocoded, point data on individual Uniform Crime Report crimes 
obtained from IPD for the years 2003 through 2008. 8 We examine total, violent, and property crime 
counts, as well as individual crime counts for homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny, and motor vehicle theft. For each outcome variable, the number of incidents per cell in each 
year was determined.  
Foreclosure Data 
The foreclosure data are geocoded point data for properties listed for sale and properties sold 
from the multiple listing service (MLS) database operated by MIBOR. MIBOR estimates that 
approximately 80 percent of single-family home sales are recorded in the MLS. Listings and sales are 
considered to be foreclosures when the property listing indicates that the property was either bank-
owned or HUD-owned. The variables are the counts of the numbers for foreclosure listings and sales 
that occurred in each grid cell and year.9 Finally, given that some grid cells had relatively high 
numbers of foreclosures, it seemed reasonable to consider the log transforms of these variables. 
Several variables measuring foreclosures could be used in predicting crime in the analyses. 
Our starting point was the number of foreclosure listings and sales in each grid cell. Because 
foreclosures in the area around a cell could affect crime in a grid cell, we also considered the 
numbers of foreclosure listings and sales in the 3x3 grid cell neighborhood surrounding each grid 
cell. Preliminary analyses considered cell foreclosure listing and sales in the cell as well as 
foreclosure listings and sales in the instant cell and surrounding 8 grid cells. The performance of 
8 Geocoding was accomplished using address information, so that crimes could be located as accurately as the 
nearest street address. Although the specific geocoding success rate was not provided by IPD, the dataset included a 
few records (less than 1 percent) with no geocoding information. Thus, one could infer that the geocoding success 
rate exceeded 99 percent. Such a success rate may be possible because IPD uses the same street database that is used 
by the 911 dispatchers. This is an extremely comprehensive and accurate database, which would contribute to a very 
high geocoding success rate. IPD also has full-time personnel engaged in “cleaning” the UCR dataset. These factors 
suggest attention to including accurate address information that could make the high geocoding success rate 
plausible. 
9 Note that a property could be listed in more than one year before it was sold or withdrawn from sale. 
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these different variables was examined using each to predict the total crime in the grid cells using the 
fixed effects negative binomial regression technique discussed below. The log of the number of 
foreclosure listings in the 3x3 neighborhood was the best predictor of total crime. Therefore, this 
measure of foreclosures was used in all of the reported analyses. 
Socioeconomic Variables 
To determine whether foreclosures affect crime (and whether the effect varies across 
socioeconomic contexts), it is necessary to include relevant socioeconomic predictors of crime. 
Therefore, we used 2000 census data to estimate values for the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
grid cells. Variables estimated from the census block data include population, percent African-
American, percent Hispanic, percent households with children with female householder, and percent 
occupied housing units owner-occupied. Variables estimated from the census block group data 
include percent of population foreign-born, percent of persons living in the same residence five years 
ago, percent of persons in the labor force unemployed, percent of persons with incomes below the 
poverty level, and median household income. Values for the grid cells were estimated by assuming 
that the persons, households, or housing units were uniformly distributed within the block or block 
group. The grid cells were intersected with the block and block group boundaries to determine the 
proportion of the area of each block and block group within each grid cell. These values were used to 
estimate the values of the variables for each grid cell. 
Numerous prior studies have shown that social structural crime predictors are often highly 
correlated (e.g., Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990; Parker & McCall, 1999). Therefore, we used 
principal components analyses to create a disadvantage index, consisting of percent unemployed, 
percent poor, percent female-headed households, and median income. Factor loadings ranged from 
0.68 to 0.83. As noted above, residential mobility may also create difficulties in maintaining informal 
social control (see Harris, 2011). Using principle components analysis, we created a stability index, 
which consisted of the percent of the population that had not moved for five years, the percent of 
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residents who are foreign-born, and the percent of owner-occupied houses. Factor loadings on this 
index ranged from 0.66-0.82. We also controlled for the percentage of the population that is African 
American and the percentage Hispanic in the cell. Finally, because more population in a cell might 
contribute to higher crime counts, we also controlled for the cell population.  
Modeling Strategy 
The dataset is a panel dataset with 1,952 cases by six years. This allows analysis using a 
fixed effects model that holds constant the effects of those grid cell characteristics that do not vary 
over time. The fixed effects model allows for stronger inference that the effect of foreclosure on 
crime is not the result of the association of foreclosures with other neighborhood characteristics that 
in turn affect crime. Use of the fixed effects model cannot guarantee that the effect of crime on 
foreclosure is a causal relationship as the possibility exists that there are other time-varying 
characteristics of the grid cells associated with both foreclosures and crime. However, the use of the 
fixed effects model permits much stronger inference than models that control for other neighborhood 
characteristics by including these as control variables, as one can never know that all relevant 
characteristics are being controlled for. 
The dependent variable in the models is the count of the number of crimes that occurred in 
each grid cell in each year. Because these are counts, their distribution is not normal, and the linear 
fixed effects model is not appropriate. The numbers of zero counts create over-dispersion in a 
Poisson model. Therefore, the fixed effects negative binomial (FENB) model is appropriate for 
estimating the relationship between crime and foreclosures (see Greene, 2000; Osgood, 2000, 
Osgood & Chambers, 2000). We used the procedure xtnbreg in Stata to estimate the FENB model 
(StataCorp, 2009). This procedure uses the method developed by Hausmann, Hall, and Griliches 
(1984) and described in Cameron and Trivedi (1998). Allison and Waterman (2002) have identified 
some problems with this procedure but were not able to produce a clearly superior alternative. 
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Allison (2005) suggests an alternative method of estimation that is used by Ellen et al. (2011). This is 
discussed more fully below in the section on alternative tests of robustness. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
We begin with basic descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the analyses. Table 1 
shows the means, standard deviations, and ranges of the variables used in the analyses. Total cell 
crime counts averaged 18.03 per cell with a range of zero to 270. Foreclosure listings ranged from 
zero to 47 with an average of 1.43. Foreclosure sales ranged from zero to 22 with an average of 0.81. 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 shows average cell crime counts and foreclosure listings by year. In general, crime counts 
and foreclosures increased each year from 2003 to 2007, but declined a bit in 2008.  
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 shows the mean crime counts (total UCR crime) by the number of foreclosure 
listings. The table clearly shows that crime in the cell steadily increases as the number of foreclosures 
increases. For example, the mean crime count per cell in cells with three foreclosures was more than 
twice that of cells with zero foreclosures (25.1 v. 12.8). Thus, examination of basic statistical 
evidence in the current data is consistent with the idea that more crime is associated with more 
foreclosure listings. Of course, Table 3 does not control for a number of other factors that might also 
drive crime counts. 
Table 3 about here 
 
Analysis of Direction of Causation 
Estimation of the effects of foreclosures on crime poses the potential issue of endogeneity. 
Although the levels of foreclosures in an area may cause changes in the levels of crime, levels of 
crime may also affect the numbers of foreclosures. This could occur if homeowners in areas with 
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high crime were more likely to stop payment and default because of the level of crime, or if mortgage 
holders of properties in high crime areas were more likely to foreclose (or to foreclose more quickly) 
because of perceived risk to the properties. To examine this, we follow the example of Hipp, Tita, 
and Greenbaum (2009) in examining the directionality of the causal relationships between crime and 
residential instability. Crime in a given year could be caused by foreclosures in the preceding year 
(lagged foreclosures), while the prior level of foreclosures cannot be caused by current crime. 
Likewise, foreclosures could be caused by lagged crime, but lagged crime could not be affected by 
current foreclosures.  
We therefore estimate FENB models regressing total crime on lagged foreclosure listings and 
regressing foreclosure listings on lagged crime. As is usual in estimating panel models, we include 
year dummy variables to account for temporal changes.10 In the first model, the lagged foreclosure 
variable is a significant predictor of total crime counts. In the second, lagged total crimes variable is 
not a significant predictor of foreclosures. These results strongly suggest that the relationship is one 
of foreclosures causing crime and not the reverse, reducing the likelihood of endogeneity issues. 
Table 4 about here 
 
Effects of Current and Lagged Foreclosures on Total Crimes 
 
Turning to the major questions of the study, we first discuss analyses of the effects of the 
current and lagged values of the log of neighborhood foreclosure listings on total crime. We ran 
models using the current value of the log of neighborhood foreclosure listings, the lagged value, and 
both, which are shown in Table 5. All models are restricted to the years 2004 to 2008 so analyses are 
being compared on comparable cases.11 Comparing the first and second models in Table 5, both the 
current and lagged foreclosure variables are significant, but the coefficient for the lagged value is 
over twice as large, with essentially the same standard error. When both the current and lagged 
10 Note that the number of cases can vary as cases were dropped when they had all zero outcomes. 
11 Models with additional lags are not considered as they would result in the loss of too many cases. 
15 
 
                                                 
foreclosure measures are included (the third model), current foreclosures are no longer significant. 
Therefore, although there is evidence that both current and prior foreclosures are associated with total 
crime counts, the lag of the log of neighborhood foreclosure listings is used in subsequent models. 
Table 5 about here 
 
Effects of Foreclosures on Types of Crimes 
 
Table 6 shows the effects of the foreclosure listing variable on total, violent, and property 
crime counts in the cell. Foreclosures are a statistically significant predictor (p <.01) of both violent 
and property crimes separately as well as cumulatively (total crime). Thus, there is consistent 
evidence that prior year foreclosures exhibit a direct positive effect on current year UCR total, 
violent, and property crime counts. 
Table 6 about here 
 
Table 7 shows the effects of foreclosures on each individual type of UCR crime. The effect 
of foreclosures on criminal homicide is not significant, which is not surprising given the small 
number of cases of homicide. Foreclosures are a significant predictor of rape, but caution should be 
used in interpreting this result, as it is also based on a smaller number of cases. Foreclosures were not 
a statistically significant predictor of robberies, but were a significant predictor (p<.01) of aggravated 
assault counts. For property crimes, foreclosures were a highly significant predictor of burglaries. 
Foreclosures did not predict larcenies or vehicle thefts. Thus, aggravated assaults and burglaries 
appear to be the UCR crimes most related to foreclosures. 
Table 7 about here 
 
Interaction Effects with Disadvantage and Stability 
 
Recall that we also argued that the effect of foreclosures on crime may vary across 
neighborhoods (see Harris, 2011). Table 8 shows the results of models that examine the interaction of 
foreclosures and neighborhood characteristics—specifically our disadvantage and stability indices—
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in predicting total crime. The first model includes no interaction terms for comparison. The second 
model includes the interaction of the indices of neighborhood disadvantage and stability with the lag 
log foreclosure listing measure. These results are in the first two columns of Table 8. The interaction 
term for disadvantage with foreclosures is not significant but the coefficient for the interaction term 
for stability with foreclosures is positive and significant. This significant interaction term means that 
the effect of foreclosures on crime is greater in neighborhoods with higher levels of stability. The 
stability index incorporates three variables, percent of owner occupied housing units, percent of 
persons foreign-born, and percent of persons living in the same residence five years ago. The final 
model includes the interactions of foreclosures with these three variables. The interaction term for 
percent-owner occupied with foreclosures is significant and positive. The other two interaction terms 
are not significant. Thus, the conditional effect of neighborhood stability on foreclosures and crime 
appears to operate through the percentages of owner occupied housing units. It could be that in cells 
where greater instability is already present, foreclosures may have less of an effect. Housing may be 
viewed as less of an asset in less stable neighborhoods. Or it could be that high foreclosure 
neighborhoods that were previously less transient are now experiencing a level of transition that may 
not have occurred otherwise. Therefore, those previously stable neighborhoods are experiencing a 
greater expectation of crimes as the number of foreclosures increases.  
Table 8 about here 
 
Checks for Robustness 
Allison and Waterman (2002) identified potential problems with the Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches (1984) procedure used by Stata to estimate FENB models in the current study. No 
alternative has been shown to be conclusively superior to that method. However, given the potential 
problems associated with the Stata procedure, we examined alternative means of estimation as a test 
of the robustness of the Stata FENB results, which are summarized in Table 9. The first base model 
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is the FENB model estimated using Stata (Table 6, total crime model). The second model in Table 9 
is a standard pooled cross-sectional model that was estimated using the standard negative binomial 
regression procedure in Stata. To control for other grid cell characteristics that might be associated 
with the dependent variable, we included: grid cell population, percent African-American, percent 
Hispanic, the disadvantage index, and the stability index, as controls. Because the cases are repeated 
each year, robust standard errors are calculated, clustering on the case ID. The lag of the log of 
neighborhood foreclosure listings is significant in the pooled cross-sectional model. The regression 
coefficient is larger than in the base model, which may be because the other variables in the model 
are not fully controlling for the effects of other neighborhood characteristics on crime. 
Table 9 about here 
 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010, p. 641) suggest that since Poisson panel estimators rely on 
weaker distributional assumptions, it may be preferable to estimate negative binomial panel models 
using the Poisson procedure, obtaining robust standard errors. With the Poisson fixed effects model, 
Stata provides a bootstrap procedure for obtaining the robust standard errors. As shown in the third 
model in Table 9, the foreclosure variable is positive and significant (p <.01) in the Poisson fixed 
effects model as well. For the final model, Ellen et al.(2011) use what they call a hybrid approach to 
estimate the FENB model following Allison (2005). They describe this estimation procedure in an 
appendix as follows: “…we transform the log-linear conditional mean function into mean-deviated 
form. Instead of the entity dummy and time variables, the D matrix now includes the independent 
variables in the form of deviations from the entity means and both the entity means, and the 
precinct*quarter dummy variables are entered into the model.” 
To implement this approach, we calculated the means of the lag of log of neighborhood 
foreclosures across years and then calculated the deviations of the lagged values from these means. 
These were then used as predictors of total crime, with the model estimated using the Stata negative 
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binomial regression procedure. Robust standard errors were obtained, clustering on the case ID. The 
results are shown as the fourth model in Table 9. The deviation of lag of log foreclosures from the 
mean is also a statistically significant predictor of crime (p <.01). All three of the alternative models 
show a significant effect of the lag of the log of neighborhood foreclosure listings on total crime. 
These results generally lead to the same substantive conclusions regarding the effects of foreclosures 
on crime using the FENB procedure as implemented in Stata. Therefore, it appears that the effect of 
prior foreclosures on crime is robust to model specification, within the limits of available estimation 
techniques. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Although neighborhood instability has long been thought to be associated with higher crime, 
until very recently the effect of home foreclosures on crime has not been the subject of much 
research. Several recent studies have examined foreclosures and crime. To date, however, most have 
been either cross-sectional or conducted on relatively large units of analysis such as counties or 
MSAs and studies have shown conflicting results (cf. Ellen et al., 2011; Kirk & Hyra, 2011). Only a 
few panel studies have been conducted at the intra-city level and only two employ units of analysis 
smaller than census tracts or police beats. In the current study we examined the relationship between 
foreclosures and crime counts in Indianapolis from 2003 to 2008 using fixed effects negative 
binomial models.   
 Results of the current study showed that both current and prior year foreclosure listings were 
consistently associated with crime counts. Prior year foreclosure listings appeared to exhibit a 
somewhat stronger effect on crime. In addition, we examined whether the effects of foreclosures on 
crime varied across neighborhoods. Somewhat counter to our expectations, the level of 
socioeconomic disadvantage in the cell did not condition the effect of foreclosures on crime counts. 
Neighborhood stability, however, conditioned the effect of foreclosures on crime. Both the overall 
stability index and one component of that index—the owner-occupied home variable—were 
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significant.  Previous studies have shown that neighborhood instability is related to negative 
outcomes, such as decreased property values. The conditional positive relationship of foreclosures 
and neighborhood stability on crime found in this study suggests that foreclosures may add instability 
to an otherwise relatively more stable neighborhood. Such findings, while preliminary and limited to 
the geography studied here, may indicate that the recent housing crisis may alert policymakers to a 
new condition of instability. Although potentially not as strong as other commonly used measures of 
neighborhood instability, the rise in foreclosures may add a new dimension that justifiably leads to 
collective action. The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program is one example of the 
acknowledgement that collective action to remediate negative outcomes of foreclosures in the least 
stable neighborhoods may be warranted.  
This study is not without its limitations. First, the study is based on one city. Although there 
is no reason to believe that Indianapolis is atypical with respect to foreclosures or crime, this is an 
empirical question. Therefore, future studies should test these propositions using small units of 
analysis in other cities. This study also relies on reported crime data. It is possible that reporting of 
data varies across neighborhoods. If so, one might imagine that areas with higher foreclosures would 
be less likely to report crime. If true, this could bias the results of the current study. The net effect 
however, would likely be that such bias would artificially dampen the relationship between 
foreclosures and crime. We also acknowledge that the FENB model estimation technique reflected in 
the Stata package is not a true fixed effects model. We estimated several alternative models which all 
produced substantively similar results. In every case, foreclosures were a significant positive 
predictor of crime. Because there is no widely-accepted alternative approach that is clearly superior 
to the one we chose, we believe that, given the available statistical techniques and evidence, the 
results described here are robust. We believe that this study contributes to what is likely to become a 
growing area of research in criminology.  
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Table 1. Basic descriptive statistics (n = 11,712) 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Total crimes 18.03 0 270 20.68 
Violent crimes 6.68 0 107 9.18 
Property crimes 11.34 0 249 13.34 
Criminal homicides 0.04 0 7 0.24 
Rapes 0.14 0 20 0.47 
Robberies 1.04 0 27 2.12 
Aggravated assaults 5.46 0 103 7.67 
Burglaries 3.29 0 53 3.82 
Larcenies 6.18 0 244 9.83 
Vehicle thefts 1.88 0 21 2.40 
Foreclosure listings 1.43 0 47 2.21 
Foreclosure sales 0.81 0 22 1.33 
Population 155.00 1 763 111.04 
Percent African-American 39.81 0.00 100.00 37.14 
Percent Hispanic 3.88 0.00 54.41 5.75 
Percent female householder 
with children 
39.49 0.00 100.00 20.45 
Percent owner-occupied 58.72 0.00 100.00 24.14 
Percent foreign-born 3.70 0.00 47.97 4.68 
Percent persons living in same 
residence five years ago 
51.12 0.00 100.00 13.44 
Percent unemployed 9.24 0.00 36.90 6.01 
Percent below poverty level 19.24 0.00 63.98 11.78 
Median household income 33,694 2,499 124,822 13,594 
 
 
Table 2. Total crimes and foreclosure listings by year 
  Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
Total crimes         
2003 16.50 0 165 18.62 
2004 17.38 0 197 19.96 
2005 18.29 0 250 21.75 
2006 18.97 0 228 21.93 
2007 19.17 0 270 21.80 
2008 17.84 0 226 19.68 
Foreclosure listings         
2003 0.86 0 14 1.51 
2004 1.16 0 12 1.84 
2005 1.37 0 18 2.02 
2006 1.59 0 31 2.33 
2007 1.86 0 47 2.77 
2008 1.73 0 22 2.40 
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Table 3. Mean number of total crimes by number of foreclosure listings 
 
Number of 
foreclosure 
listings 
Number of 
observations 
Mean number 
of total crimes 
0 5,967 12.83 
1 1,962 17.99 
2 1,277 20.15 
3 850 25.14 
4 570 26.37 
5 366 31.17 
6 283 32.14 
7 169 34.99 
8 85 36.58 
9 68 41.69 
10 or more 115 41.77 
 
Table 4. Examination of endogeneity using lagged regressions 
 
Independent variables Dependent variable 
  
Total number of 
crimes 
Number of 
foreclosure 
listings 
Lagged foreclosure listings 0.00708*** -- 
 
(0.00238) 
 Lagged total crimes -- 0.000218 
  
(0.00129) 
Year 2005 0.0377*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0308) 
Year 2006 0.0780*** 0.312*** 
 
(0.0110) (0.0301) 
Year 2007 0.0951*** 0.467*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.0295) 
Year 2008 0.0302*** 0.401*** 
 
(0.0115) (0.0299) 
Constant 3.187*** 2.786*** 
  (0.0443) (0.186) 
Observations 9,370 6,885 
Number of case id 1,874 1,377 
Wald chi-squared 117.43*** 334.48*** 
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Predicting total crime using current and lagged foreclosures 
Independent variables Current 
foreclosures 
Lagged 
foreclosures 
Current and 
lagged 
foreclosures 
Log neighborhood foreclosure listings 0.0218* -- 0.0145 
 
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0113) 
Lag of log of neighborhood foreclosure -- 0.0475*** 0.0453*** 
  listings 
 
(0.0111) (0.0112) 
Year 2005 0.0372*** 0.0285** 0.0268** 
 
(0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0115) 
Year 2006 0.0765*** 0.0629*** 0.0597*** 
 
(0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0121) 
Year 2007 0.0925*** 0.0755*** 0.0706*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0131) 
Year 2008 0.0314*** 0.00697 0.00296 
 
(0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0138) 
Constant 3.140*** 3.089*** 3.056*** 
 
(0.0532) (0.0512) (0.0572) 
Observations 9,370 9,370 9,370 
Number of cases 1,874 1,874 1,874 
Wald chi-squared 112.08*** 126.47*** 127.91*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6. Effects of foreclosures on total crime, violent crime, and property crime 
Independent variable Dependent variable 
  
Total crime Violent crime Property 
crime 
Lag of log of neighborhood foreclosure 0.0475*** 0.0621*** 0.0372*** 
  listings (0.0111) (0.0171) (0.0130) 
Year 2005 0.0285** 0.0606*** 0.0146 
 
(0.0114) (0.0169) (0.0138) 
Year 2006 0.0629*** 0.0285 0.0886*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0179) (0.0142) 
Year 2007 0.0755*** 0.0612*** 0.0895*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0188) (0.0149) 
Year 2008 0.00697 0.00162 0.0123 
 
(0.0134) (0.0203) (0.0160) 
Constant 3.089*** 2.717*** 2.794*** 
  (0.0512) (0.0736) (0.0556) 
Observations 9370 9030 9325 
Number of cases 1874 1806 1865 
Wald chi-squared 126.47*** 53.78*** 121.03*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Effects of foreclosures by type of crime 
Independent 
variable Dependent variable 
  
Homicide Rape Robbery Agg 
Assault 
Burglary Larceny Vehicle 
theft 
Lag Log 
neighbor 0.234 0.272*** 0.0140 0.0631*** 0.0622*** 0.0238 0.0421 
Foreclosure 
listings 
(0.175) 
 
(0.0930) 
 
(0.0368) 
 
(0.0189) 
 
(0.0222) 
 
(0.0164) 
 
(0.0269) 
 
Year 2005 -0.0825 -0.0785 0.155*** 0.0539*** -0.0682*** 0.0636*** 0.0553** 
 
(0.171) (0.0892) (0.0381) (0.0185) (0.0235) (0.0179) (0.0270) 
Year 2006 0.00937 -0.130 0.154*** 0.0145 0.0122 0.168*** 0.000772 
 
(0.175) (0.0943) (0.0395) (0.0196) (0.0241) (0.0182) (0.0287) 
Year 2007 -0.117 -0.182* 0.292*** 0.0298 0.0357 0.101*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.187) (0.100) (0.0410) (0.0206) (0.0254) (0.0194) (0.0293) 
Year 2008 -0.241 -0.373*** 0.255*** -0.0307 0.0305 0.0130 -0.0493 
 
(0.203) (0.112) (0.0439) (0.0223) (0.0270) (0.0209) (0.0324) 
Constant -0.825 1.253*** 2.307*** 2.556*** 1.942*** 2.506*** 2.512*** 
 
(0.564) (0.401) (0.181) (0.0777) (0.0784) (0.0668) (0.138) 
Observations 1,440 3,635 7,055 8,895 9,010 9,235 8,725 
N of crimes 288 727 1,411 1,779 1,802 1,847 1,745 
Wald chi-
squared 3.12 13.89** 85.35*** 36.07*** 52.14*** 140.73*** 83.19*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 - Interaction of foreclosures with neighborhood disadvantage and stability predicting total crime 
 
Independent variables Model without 
interaction terms 
Interactions with 
disorganization 
and stability 
Interactions with 
components of 
stability 
Lag log neighborhood foreclosure listings 0.0475*** 0.0520*** -0.0637* 
 
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0364) 
Disadvantage * lag log neighborhood -- -0.000048 -- 
  foreclosure listings 
 
(0.00876) 
 Stability * lag log neighborhood foreclosure -- 0.0260*** -- 
  listings 
 
(0.00869) 
 Percent owner-occupied * lag log -- -- 0.00113*** 
  neighborhood foreclosure listings 
  
(0.000397) 
Percent foreign-born * lag log neighborhood -- -- 0.00180 
  foreclosure listings 
  
(0.00160) 
Percent living same residence five years ago -- -- 0.000879 
  * lag log neighborhood foreclosure listings 
  
(0.000746) 
Year 2005 0.0285** 0.0263** 0.0265** 
 
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
Year 2006 0.0629*** 0.0612*** 0.0599*** 
 
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Year 2007 0.0755*** 0.0745*** 0.0734*** 
 
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Year 2008 0.00697 0.00638 0.00634 
 
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
Constant 3.089*** 3.103*** 3.112*** 
  (0.0512) (0.0523) (0.0518) 
Observations 9,370 9,360 9,370 
Number of caseid 1,874 1,872 1,874 
Wald chi-squared 126.47*** 137.23*** 145.55*** 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Alternative models predicting total crime as test of robustness 
 
Independent variables  Model estimated 
using Stata 
negative binomial 
fixed effects 
procedure 
Pooled cross-
sectional model 
estimated using 
negative binomial 
procedure with 
robust standard 
errors 
Model estimated 
using Stata 
Poisson fixed 
effects procedure 
with bootstrap 
standard errors 
Model using 
Allison/Ellen 
procedure 
estimated using 
negative 
binomial 
procedure with 
robust standard 
errors 
Lag log neighborhood foreclosure 0.0649*** 0.186*** 0.0373*** -- 
  listings (0.00885) (0.0246) (0.0143) 
 Deviation of lag log foreclosures -- -- -- 0.0334*** 
  from mean across cases 
   
(0.0109) 
Mean across cases lag log -- -- -- 0.361*** 
 neighborhood foreclosure listings 
   
(0.0352) 
Population -- 0.00336*** -- -- 
  
(0.000288) 
  Percent African-American -- -9.41e-05 -- -- 
  
(0.000934) 
  Percent Hispanic -- 0.00436 -- -- 
  
(0.00431) 
  Disadvantage index -- 0.0960** -- -- 
  
(0.0382) 
  Stability index -- -0.305*** -- -- 
  
(0.0362) 
  Constant 3.041*** 1.784*** -0.405*** 2.077*** 
  (0.0489) (0.0732) (0.0575) (0.0951) 
Observations 9,370 9,590 9,370 9,760 
Number of case id 1,874   1,874   
Wald chi-squared 53.84*** 695.08*** 9.07*** 111.91*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Map 1. Indianapolis and 1,000 feet Grid Cells 
All streets
1000-foot grid cells
IPD service area
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